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Civic boosters generally have estimated the Super Bowl to have an impact of $300 to
$400 million on a host city’s economy. The National Football League has used the promise of
an economic windfall to convince skeptical cities that investments in new stadiums for their
teams in exchange for the right to host the event makes economic sense. Evidence from host
cities from 1970-2001 indicates the Super Bowl contributes approximately one-quarter of what
the boosters have promised and that the game could not have contributed by any reasonable
standard of statistical significance, more than $300 million to host economies.
JEL Classification Codes: L83, R53




A joint study conducted by the National Football League (NFL) and the Sport 
Management Research Institute (SMRI) of Westin, Florida estimated an economic impact of 
$393 million from Super Bowl XXXIII on the South Florida economy (NFL, 1999).  If those 
numbers are accurate, “Super” is an apt adjective for the event.  Only the Summer Olympic 
Games can seriously be thought to generate an impact of such magnitude for a short-term 
sporting event.  Reasons for skepticism, however, abound, and one may well need look no 
further than the NFL’s motivation for making such lofty claims.  Can a study either 
commissioned or performed by the NFL be unbiased if the NFL has used the promise of a future 
Super Bowl as an enticement for cities to build new facilities?  Modern sports stadiums generally 
receive some form of public funding, and the NFL at least indirectly has rationalized public 
financial support on the grounds that the economic impact from a single Super Bowl 
approximates the cost of building a new stadium.  Coincidence?  The purpose of this study is to 
estimate the economic impact of Super Bowls from 1970 through 2001.  The results indicate that 
the economic impact of the Super Bowl is likely on average one-quarter or less the magnitude of 
the most recent NFL estimates. 
  
II. REVIEW OF SUPER BOWL IMPACT STUDIES 
The economic impact estimates for the Super Bowl extend from one intellectual end zone 
to the other.  The NFL-SMRI study is the most optimistic appraisal attributing a $670 million 
increase in taxable sales in South Florida (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties) and 
an increase in economic activity of $396 million to the event (NFL, 1999).  Tacitly, the NFL- 
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commissioned study envisioned a horde of affluent spendthrifts descending on the three-county 
area.  The NFL-SMRI team reported that the average income of Super Bowl attendees is more 
than twice that of the average visitor to South Florida during the peak tourist months of January 
and February ($144,500 compared to $40,000-$80,000), and they spend up to four times as much 
as the average visitor to South Florida ($400.33 per day compared to $99-$199 per day).  Jim 
Steeg, the NFL’s Vice President for special events since 1977, puts the Super Bowl at the center 
of the mega-event universe. 
The Super Bowl is the most unique of all special events.  Extensive studies by 
host cities, independent organizations and the NFL all try to predict the economic 
impact the big game will have on a community.  They talk to tens of thousands of 
attendees, local businessmen, corporate planners, media and local fans -- looking 
to see how they are affected. 
 
These studies have provided irrefutable evidence that a Super Bowl is the most 
dramatic event in the U.S.  Super Bowl patrons are significantly more affluent, 
spend more and have more spent on them, and influence future business in the 
community more than attendees of any other event or convention held in the U.S. 
(Steeg, 1999). 
  
  Steeg based his Super Bowl claims on several factors.  Most prominent among them from 
his perspective were: the substantial spending by the NFL and NFL Properties
1 ; the number of 
visitors from outside the community who attended the game and related events; and the ideal fit 
of the Super Bowl into the convention calendar, which Steeg opined has the capacity for 
transforming the historically slack month of January into a convention windfall for the host city.  
The NFL understands that it is competing for the sports entertainment dollar, and the 
League believes that stadiums factor prominently into consumer decisions relating to leisure 
spending.  With the completion of stadium construction in Chicago, Green Bay, and 
Philadelphia, 21 NFL stadiums will have been built or significantly refurbished over the period  
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1995 through 2003. This substantial transformation of NFL infrastructure has been accomplished 
in part through league incentives to include hosting a Super Bowl in some cases and using 
League shared club seat revenues to help finance stadium construction.
2  In light of the NFL’s 
strategic success, Steeg’s claims warrant further scrutiny. 
Scholars not directly connected to the NFL disagree on the economic impact of the Super 
Bowl.  In assessing the impact of Super Bowl XXVIII on the City of Atlanta and the State of 
Georgia, Jeffrey Humphreys (1994) estimated that the event created 2,736 jobs and had an 
impact of $166 million on the Georgia economy.  Of the $166 million, Humphreys estimated 
direct and indirect economic impact of $76 and $90 million, respectively.  The direct impact was 
derived from estimating the number of “visitor days” (306,680) and multiplying that statistic by 
the average estimated per diem expenditures per visitor ($252).  The indirect or induced 
economic impact was estimated using the Regional Input-Output Multiplier System (RIMS II) 
model developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  A portion of the roughly $230 million 
difference between the estimates for Super Bowls XXXIII and XXVIII is explained by price 
increases, but most of the difference is attributable to the number of visitors and the daily 
spending attributable to each of them.  In Table 1, a sample of economic impact estimates for 
selected Super Bowls from 1995 through 2003 are recorded to help provide a context for the 
impact of the event. 
Phil Porter (1999) has provided a far less sanguine appraisal of the Super Bowl’s 
economic impact.  Porter used regression analysis to determine that the impact of the event was 
statistically insignificant, that is not measurably different from zero.  After reviewing short-term 
data
3 on sales receipts for several Super Bowls, Porter concluded:  
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Investigator bias, data measurement error, changing production relationships, 
diminishing returns to both scale and variable inputs, and capacity constraints 
anywhere along the chain of sales relations lead to lower multipliers.  Crowding 
out and price increases by input suppliers in response to higher levels of demand 
and the tendency of suppliers to lower prices to stimulate sales when demand is 
weak lead to overestimates of net new sales due to the event.  These 
characteristics alone would suggest that the estimated impact of the mega-
sporting event will be lower than the impact analysis predicts.   
  Similarly, Baade and Matheson’s (1999) examination of twenty-five Super Bowls from 
1973 to 1997 found the game associated with an increase in host metropolitan area employment 
of 537 jobs. Based on simple assumptions regarding the value of a job to a community, they 
estimate an average economic impact of roughly $30 million or roughly one-tenth the figures 
touted by the NFL.  Coates and Humphrey’s (2002) cursory look at all post-season play in 
American professional sports found that hosting the Super Bowl had no statistically significant 
effect on per capita income in the host city.  
  From 1995 through 2003, approximately $6.4 billion dollars, or an average of $304 
million, will have been spent to build or substantially refurbish twenty-one NFL stadiums.  The 
public contribution will have been $4.4 billion, an average of $209 million, or roughly 69% of 
the construction costs of these facilities (Peter, 2002). The NFL has offered the Super Bowl as an 
inducement to convince otherwise reluctant cities that the construction of a new stadium makes 
economic sense.  (It’s hard to believe that the NFL would choose to place the Super Bowl in 
Detroit in January of 2006 except for the presence of the newly constructed Ford Field.) Scholars 
do not agree on the economic impact of the Super Bowl, and in the next section of the paper, 




III. THEORETICAL ISSUES 
  If there is an exaggeration of the benefits induced by a sports mega-event, it occurs for 
several fundamental reasons.  First, the increase in direct spending attributable to the games may  
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be a “gross” as opposed to a “net” measure.  Some subsidy advocates estimate direct spending by 
simply summing all receipts associated with the event.  The fact that the gross-spending 
approach fails to account for decreased spending directly attributable to the event represents a 
major theoretical and practical shortcoming.  Surveys on expenditures by those attending the 
event, complete with a question on place of residence, would appear to be a straightforward way 
of estimating direct expenditures in a manner that is statistically acceptable.  However, while 
such surveys may well provide acceptable spending estimates for those patronizing the event, 
they do not reveal changes in spending by residents not attending it.  It is conceivable that some 
local residents or potential visitors may dramatically change their spending given their desire to 
avoid the congestion at least in the venue’s environs.  A basic shortcoming of typical economic 
impact studies, in general, pertains not to information on spending by those included in a direct 
expenditure survey, but rather to the lack of information on the spending behavior for those who 
are not.  
Robert Baade (1996) has cited the failure to account for the difference between gross and 
net spending as a chief reason why sports events or teams do not contribute as much to 
metropolitan economies as boosters claim.  However, in the case of a “mega-event,” a large 
proportion of all attendees come from outside the local area, and their spending qualifies as 
export spending.  If the host city’s residents who do not attend do not reduce their expenditures 
within the city, one might contend that direct expenditure by nonresidents who attend events 
approximates net impact.  Unfortunately, this will not be true if some nonresidents, who might 
have visited the city, decide not to do so because of congestion and high prices during the 
event’s period.  In addition, some Super Bowl fans may have already been planning on visiting a  
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city but rearrange their schedule to accommodate the sporting event.  Even though the economic 
analyst may attribute this visit to the athletic contest, in fact, this type of time switching does not 
lead to a net increase in economic activity in the city but simply alters the time period in which 
the activity takes place. 
Recent evidence assessing the economic impact of the Summer Olympics in 2000 in 
Sydney, Australia indicate this particular “substitution effect” may be substantial even in cases 
where the event has a clear international character.  An Arthur Andersen (2000) survey on hotel 
activity in Sydney and other capital cities prior to and during the Olympic Games concluded,  
As expected, survey results indicate the vast majority of Sydney hotels peaking at 
near 100% occupancies during the Games period from September 16-30.  This 
represents an increase of 49% in occupancy levels relative to the first half of 
September. In contrast, other capital cities experienced significant demand 
shortfalls for the same period.  For example, occupancies in Melbourne and 
Brisbane plummeted by 19% and 17% in the second half of September relative to 
the period from 1-15 September.  Overall, with the exception of Sydney and 
Adelaide, all hotel markets in Australia experienced a decline in occupancy in 
September 2000 relative to September 1999 despite the Olympic Games, as 
reported in the Hotel Industry Benchmark Survey.  Hoteliers indicate that while 
international demand was strong..., domestic leisure travel traditionally taking 
place during the September school holiday period was displaced to Sydney for the 
Olympics. 
 
  The Anderson report indicates the importance of the substitution effect, and compels 
consideration of which, if any, governmental entities should be involved in subsidizing sports 
mega-events.  Sydney’s gains may well have come at the expense of other Australian cities, and 
if the federal government subsidizes the games there must be a rationale for enriching Sydney at 
the expense of Adelaide and other regional cities.  
  A second reason economic impact may be exaggerated relates to what economists refer to 
as the “multiplier,” the notion that direct spending increases induce additional rounds of  
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spending due to increased incomes that occur as a result of additional spending.  If errors are 
made in assessing direct spending, those errors are compounded in calculating indirect spending 
through standard multiplier analysis.  Furthermore, correct multiplier analysis includes all 
“leakages” from the circular flow of payments and uses multipliers that are appropriate to the 
event industry.  Leakages may be significant depending on the state of the economy.  If the host 
economy is at or very near full employment, for example, it may be that the labor essential to 
conducting the event resides in other communities where unemployment or a labor surplus 
exists.  To the extent that this is true, then the indirect spending that constitutes the multiplier 
effect must be adjusted to reflect this leakage of income and subsequent spending.  Siegfried and 
Zimbalist (2002) note that only 29% of professional athletes in their study live in the 
metropolitan area in which their team plays leading to very high levels of leakage from local 
expenditures on professional sports. 
Labor is not the only factor of production that may repatriate income.  If hotels 
experience higher than normal occupancy rates during a mega-event, then the question must be 
raised about the fraction of increased earnings that remain in the community if the hotel is a 
nationally owned chain.  Finally, most economic impact analyses use expenditure multipliers 
(rather than income multipliers) to assess the economic impact of an event. The use of 
expenditure multipliers is unjustified, however, as the important point is not how much business 
activity is created by an event but rather how the income of local residents is impacted by it.  In 
short, to assess the impact of mega-events, a balance of payments approach should be utilized.  
That is to say, to what extent does the event give rise to income inflows and outflows that would 
not occur in its absence?  Since the input-output models used in the most sophisticated ex ante  
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analyses are based on fixed relationships between inputs and outputs, such models do not 
account for the subtleties of full employment and capital ownership noted here. 
Even to the extent that multipliers are calculated from careful analysis of industry data 
over an extended period of time, the multipliers are derived from input-output tables based on 
the normal state of the economy even though the presence of a large temporary tourist attraction 
such as a the Super Bowl indicates a departure from this normal state. Mega-events such as the 
Super Bowl are characterized by high utilization rates and increased prices for tourism related 
industries. While labor may benefit to some extent through increases in hours worked or higher 
tips, the main recipient of this windfall is likely to be business owners. Expenditures in industries 
dominated by nationally-owned chains such as large hotels, rental car agencies, and airlines, and 
to a lesser extent motels, restaurants, and general retailers may rise significantly due to the Super 
Bowl, but local incomes will not increase substantially.  Since the benefits accrue to non-local 
capital owners leading to higher than normal leakages of income, the money generated from 
these events is unlikely to  recirculate through the economy. Normal multipliers are therefore 
probably inflated. 
As an alternative to estimating the change in expenditures and associated changes in 
economic activity, those who provide goods and services directly in accommodating the event 
could be asked how their activity has been altered by the event.  In summarizing the efficacy of 
this technique Davidson (1999) opined: 
The biggest problem with this producer approach is that these business managers 
must be able to estimate how much “extra” spending was caused by the sport event.  
This requires that each proprietor have a model of what would have happened during 
that time period had the sport event not taken place.  This is an extreme requirement, 
which severely limits this technique. 
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While many potential criticisms of ex ante economic analysis exist, the real question is 
whether these estimates of the economic impact of the Super Bowl conform to ex post estimates 
of the economic impact this event exerts on its host cities?  In the next section of the paper, the 
model that is used to develop ex post estimates is detailed. 
 
IV. THE MODEL 
Ex ante models may not provide credible estimates on the economic impact of a mega-
event for the reasons cited.  An ex post model may be useful in providing a filter through which 
the promises made by event boosters can be strained.   A mega-event’s impact is likely to be 
small relative to the overall economy, and the primary challenge for those doing a post-event 
audit involves isolating the event’s impact.  This is not a trivial task, and those who seek insight 
into the question of economic impact should be cognizant of the challenges and deficiencies 
common to both ex ante and ex post analyses.  
Several approaches are possible in constructing a model to estimate the impact an event 
has had on a city, and are suggested by past scholarly work.  Mills and McDonald (1992) 
provide an extensive summary of models that have been used to explain metropolitan economic 
growth.  These theories seek to explain increases in economic activity through changes in key 
economic variables in the short-run (export base and neoclassical models) or the identification of 
long-term developments that enhance the capacity for growth in metropolitan economies 
(product cycle, cumulative causation, and disequilibrium dynamic adjustment models).   
Our task is not to replicate explanations of metropolitan economic growth, but to use past 
work to help identify how much of an increase in economic activity in U.S. cities hosting the  
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Super Bowl is attributable to the event.  To this end we have selected explanatory variables from 
existing models to predict economic activity in the absence of the game.  Estimating the 
economic impact of the Super Bowl involves comparing the projected level of economic activity 
without the event to the actual levels of economic activity that occurred in cities that have hosted 
it.  The success of this approach depends on our ability to identify variables that account for the 
variation in growth in economic activity in host cities.  
Given the number and variety of variables found in regional growth models and the 
inconsistency of findings with regard to coefficient size and significance, criticisms of any single 
model could logically focus on the problems posed by omitted variables.  Any critic, of course, 
can claim that a particular regression suffers from omitted-variable bias, but it is far more 
challenging to specify the model so as to remedy the problem.  In explaining regional or 
metropolitan growth patterns, at least some of the omitted variable problem can be addressed 
through a careful specification of the independent variables.  As noted above, representing 
relevant variables as deviations from city norms, leaves the scholar a more manageable task, 
namely that of identifying those factors that explain city growth after accounting for the impact 
of those forces that generally have affected regional or national MSA growth.  It is important, for 
example, to model the fact that relocating a business could occur as a consequence of wages 
increasing in the MSA under study or a slower rate of wage growth in other MSAs.  What 
matters is not the absolute level of wages in city i, but city i’s wage relative to that of its 
competitors.  
The purpose of ex ante studies is to provide a measure of the net benefits a project or 
event is likely to yield.  To our knowledge there is no prospective model that has the capacity for  
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measuring the net benefits of a project relative to the next best alternative use of those funds.  If 
one assumes that the best use of funds has always occurred prior to a mega-event, then the 
growth path observed for a city can be construed as optimal.  If this optimal growth path, 
identified by the city’s secular growth trend, decreases after the mega-event occurs, then the 
evidence does not support the hypothesis that a publicly subsidized mega-event put those public 
monies to the best use.   
Our model is designed to predict changes in income attributable to the Super Bowl in 
host cities 1970 and 2001.  The cohort of cities used in the sample includes seventy-three 
metropolitan areas that represent the largest MSAs in the United States by population over the 
time period 1970-2001 including every MSA that was among the largest sixty MSAs at some 
time during that period.  While the choice of seventy-three cities is largely arbitrary, the list was 
expanded to include all metropolitan areas that have hosted the Super Bowl, cities with 
professional sports franchises (with the exception of Green Bay, WI), and MSAs with 
professional sports aspirations. The data used are described more fully in Appendix 1.  
At this point the analysis can be conducted in two ways. Traditionally, researchers such 
as Coates and Humphreys (2002) and Baade and Matheson (2000) have used fixed effect models 
on this type of panel data with a dummy variable included for the sporting event(s) and 
individual dummy variables included for each city in the model to account for regional 
difference in economic growth. Equation (1) represents the model used to predict changes in 
income for host cities.   
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For each time period t, Yt
i is the real personal income and ∆Yt
i is the change in real 
personal income in the ith metropolitan statistical area (MSA), n is the number of cities in the 
sample, Wt
i is the nominal wages in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all cities in 
the sample, Gt
i is the state and local taxes in the ith MSA as a percentage of the average for all 
cities in the sample, POPt
i is the log population of the ith city, SBt
i is a dummy variable for 
hosting the Super Bowl, and εt
i is the stochastic error.  OTt
i is a dummy variable that represents 
any significant city-specific economic influences that cannot be explained by other variables in 
the model including the effects of the oil booms of the 1970s and the subsequent oil bust of the 
1980s on oil patch cities of New Orleans and Houston, the effects of Hurricane Andrew on the 
economy of South Florida, and the economic consequences of the tech boom in Silicon Valley.  
C
i is a vector of dummy variables representing the fixed effect for each city i, and t is a vector of 
dummy variables representing each year t representing the business cycle. By specifying 
variables that either represent wages or taxes a percentage of the average, and by using lagged 
income percentages, problems of endogeneity are largely avoided.  
  The results of ordinary least-squares regression using equation (1) are shown in Table 2.  
The coefficient (0.4058%) and t-statistic (1.409) on the Super Bowl variable indicate that hosting 
the Super Bowl is associated with an increase in city personal income growth of 0.4% but that 
this figure is not statistically significantly different from zero at a 10% level.   
  While the use of fixed effect models is widespread due to their simplicity, they present 
numerous theoretical and applied difficulties that make their use undesirable when they can be  
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avoided.  First, the assumptions implicit in the model are quite extreme in that it is assumed the 
only difference in city growth rates is a fixed percentage in each period. This belies the fact that 
some cities (such as Detroit or San Jose) are strongly influenced by cyclical industries, and 
others have experienced growth spurts or slowdowns at varying times in their recent history.  To 
assume that every economic variable affects every city’s economic growth in exactly the same 
way is an absurd albeit often necessary assumption. Next heteroscedasticity is identified as a 
problem since the variability of the residuals differs widely between cities. For example, the 
standard deviation of the residuals for the data representing Minneapolis is 0.0056 while the 
standard deviation of San Jose’s residuals is 0.0220, and a Goldfield-Quandt test for equality of 
residual variance can be rejected at well beyond a 1% significance level.  
  In addition, because the size of the economies of the host cities varies widely, it is 
difficult to translate the coefficient indicating a 0.4% increase in economic growth into a 
convenient dollar figure. Indeed, if the Super Bowl is, say, a $400 million event, there is no 
reason to think that economic growth in each city would be altered by the same amount since 
percentage-wise such an impact would be different in a small city such as New Orleans 
compared to a large city such as Los Angeles. Finally, a confidence interval for the Super Bowl 
variable ranges from a negative range to roughly a 1% gain in city income, which would 
correspond to roughly an $800 million income in city income for the average host city. So, while 
a hypothesis of no income gain from hosting the Super Bowl cannot be rejected, neither can the 
booster’s predictions of a $400 million gain be rejected.  
  While some of these issues, as well as potential serial correlation problems, can be dealt 
with a more advance time-series, panel data regression model, we instead propose a wholly  
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different approach. Equation (2) represents the revised model used to predict changes in income 
for host cities.   
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    (2) 
The variables remain the same as in equation (1) except for the Super Bowl variable.  SBt
i 
is now a vector of dummy variables representing the Super Bowl with a separate dummy 
variable being included for each year a particular city has hosted the game.  The major change is 
that equation (2) was separately estimated for each of the eleven different metropolitan areas that 
have hosted at least one Super Bowl since 1970 instead of as a panel.  Not every variable 
specified in equation (2) emerged as statistically significant for every city.  The decision of 
whether to include an independent variable known to be a good predictor in general but failing to 
be statistically significant in a particular city’s case is largely an arbitrary one.  The inclusion of 
theoretically valuable variables that are idiosyncratically insignificant will improve some 
measures of fit such as R-squared but may reduce other measures such as adjusted R-squared or 
the standard error of the estimate.  Since the purpose of equation (2) is to produce predictive 
rather than explanatory results, variables were included in the regression equation as long as they 
improved predictive success, and as long as the omission of the variable did not significantly 
alter the coefficients of the remaining variables.  Table 3 presents the regression results for all 
cities with the combination of variables that minimizes the standard error of the estimate (SEE). 
Note that Table 3 does not report the regression results for the Super Bowl dummy variables, 
which are instead reported in Table 4. Finally, Durbin-Watson statistics were calculated for each 
of the eleven regression equations in Table 3. The results of the Durbin-Watson statistics  
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suggested that serial correlation was not a significant problem in any of the eleven regression 
equations. 
As mentioned previously, rather than specifying all the variables that may explain 
metropolitan growth, we attempted to simplify the task by including only the independent 
variables that are common to cities in general and the ith MSA in particular.  In effect we have 
devised a structure that attempts to identify the extent to which the deviations from the growth of 
cities in general (Σ∆Yt
i /nt ) and city i’s secular growth ∆Y
i
t-1, are attributable to deviations in 
certain costs of production (wages and taxes) or demand-side variables (relative income levels, 
wages, and taxes). 
Relative values of wages and tax burdens are all expected to help explain a city’s growth 
rate in income as it deviates from the sample norm and its own secular growth path. As 
mentioned above, past research has not produced consistency with respect to the signs and 
significance of these independent variables.  It is not at all clear, for example, whether high 
levels of relative wages lead to higher or lower income growth.  A similar situation exists with 
relative levels of taxation.  As a consequence, a priori expectations are uncertain with regard to 
the signs of the coefficients.  That should not be construed as an absence of theory about key 
economic relationships.  As noted earlier, the models include those variables that previous 
scholarly work found important.   
 
V. RESULTS 
The coefficients on the dummy variables for the Super Bowl vector for each model 
identified in Table 3 are an estimate of the effect of the Super Bowl in each specific year on the  
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host city.  These coefficients and their corresponding t-stats are shown in Table 4 in the columns 
labeled “Difference” and “t-stat” along with the real income of each city during the Super Bowl 
year and the actual observed growth in real income. A predicted personal income growth rate 
absent the Super Bowl can be calculated by taking the observed growth rate and subtracting out 
the Super Bowl coefficient. If it is assumed that any difference between actual and predicted 
income can be accounted for by the presence of the Super Bowl, this method allows for a dollar 
estimate of the impact of the game on host cities.  
For example, the actual personal income growth rate for Phoenix in 1996 was 5.598% 
while the coefficient on the 1996 Super Bowl dummy variable was 0.528% implying a predicted 
growth rate absent the Super Bowl of only 5.070% since the model residual for 1996 was 0.000. 
Based on Phoenix’s $71.3 billion economy, this 0.528% difference corresponds to an economy 
that produced income $377 million in excess of what would have expected during 1996 if the 
city had not hosted the championship.  The $377 million can be interpreted as the contribution of 
the Super Bowl to the Phoenix economy.  In total, the model estimates that the average host city 
experienced a reduction in personal income of $133.4 million relative to the predictions of the 
model. 
The statistics recorded in Table 4 suggest two things worth noting.  First, the dollar 
differences recorded in final column vary substantially with some cities exhibiting income gains 
well in excess of reasonable booster predictions, and other cities showing a large negative 
impact.  Second, the Super Bowl has an overall negative impact on the host city economy of 
$133.4 million.  While this figure is biased downward due to the poor economic performance of  
Los Angeles in several years, nevertheless this estimate stands in stark contrast to the annual  
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gains of $300 or $400 million projected by the NFL.   
The magnitude of the variation of the estimates at first blush appears high.  Some host 
cities (Los Angeles, 1987, and San Diego, 1998) exhibited well over a billion dollars in 
increased income while others (Los Angeles, 1993 and 1973, and Atlanta, 2000) experienced 
reductions of billions of dollars.  The explanation for this range of estimates is simply that the 
models do not explain all the variation in estimated income, and, therefore, not all the variation 
can be attributed to the Super Bowl.  In short, there are omitted variables.  While the model fit 
statistics for the individual city regressions display moderately high R-squared numbers, the 
standard error of the estimate for the typical city is above one percent meaning that one would 
expected the models to predict actual economic growth for the cities in question within one 
percentage point less than about two-thirds of the time. For the cities in question, a one percent 
error translates into a $200 to $500 million difference for the smallest cities such as Miami and 
New Orleans and over a $2 billion difference for Los Angeles, the largest host city. Given the 
size of these large, diverse economies, the effect of even a large event with hundreds of millions 
of dollars of potential impact is likely to be obscured by natural, unexplained variations in the 
economy. Indeed, none of the standardized residuals are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
While it is unlikely that the models for any individual city will capture the effects of even 
a large event, one would expect that across a large number of cities and years, any event that 
produces a large impact would emerge on average as statistically significant.  The t-statistics of 
the Super Bowl coefficients for the 32 years are normally distributed with a standard deviation of 
1.  A test on the null hypothesis that the average t-statistic is greater than zero provides a p-value  
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of 23.0%.  In other words, if the game really had no positive effect on the host cities, then the 
sample results had only a 23.0% probability of occurring.  
This procedure can be carried one step further.  Since the presence of the Super Bowl is 
not included in making predictions about the economic growth in a particular city, if the Super 
Bowl has a substantial positive effect on host economies as the boosters suggest, then the 
appropriate hypothesis test would not be whether the average standardized residual is greater 
than zero (meaning simply that the event had a positive economic impact) but whether the 
average standardized residual is greater than some figure that essentially represents a 
combination of the size of projected impact in comparison to the size of the host city (meaning 
that the event had a positive economic impact of some designated magnitude.) 
Table 5 records various estimates that combine estimates provided by NFL boosters and 
those predicted by the model.  For the purpose of exposition, a $300 million Super Bowl (in 
2000 dollars) effect is assumed, a figure on the low end of the most recent booster estimates.  
The model indicates that Phoenix exhibited an increase in income of $377 million over that 
predicted for the city during 1969 if it had not hosted the game.  The difference of $77 million 
represents the contribution of the Super Bowl to the Phoenix economy above that of boosters’ 
estimates. While the model predicts that Phoenix should have grown 5.070% in 1999 compared 
with 5.598 actual growth, if a booster estimate of $300 million is accurate and the model’s 
predictors are uncorrelated to the presence of the Super Bowl, the prediction for Phoenix’s 
economic growth would have been 5.491%.  Using these new predicted growth rates that include 
booster growth projections, new t-statistics can be calculated.  A new test on the null hypothesis 
that the new average t-statistic is greater than zero provides a p-value of 5.00%.  In other words,  
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had the game had a positive effect of $300 million as asserted by the boosters over the thirty-two 
year period covered by the data, the actual growth rates experienced by the sample would have 
had only a 5.00% probability of occurring.   
The Super Bowl contribution to predicted growth (and hence the standardized residual) 
can be adjusted by assuming an economic impact larger or smaller than the $300 million figure 
used in this example. The resulting p-values shown are shown in Table 6.  
The predicted economic impact at which the mean t-statistic is zero is $91.9 million, a 
figure roughly one-quarter that of the booster’s estimates, and increases in income of  $300 
million and $392.8 million can be rejected at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
The crowding-out, substitution, and leakages effects can explain the large discrepancy between 
the observed and actual economic growth and the NFL’s claims.  While the Super Bowl 
undoubtedly attracts large numbers of wealthy, out-of-town visitors, the “crowding-out” effect 
due to perceptions relating to limited hotel rooms and high hotel prices, rowdy behavior of 
football fans, and peak use of public goods such as highways and sidewalks are substantial.  
Furthermore, the net effect on the host economy of the conventions or other tourists who went 
elsewhere would depend on the details relating to the spending patterns of football fans versus 
those of the lost visitors and convention attendees.  The spending of residents of the host city 
may be altered to the detriment of the city’s economy as local citizens may not frequent areas in 
which the event occurs or the fans stay.  In addition, although hotel room rates in host cities 
invariably increase substantially during the Super Bowl weekend, the to the extent that these 
hotels are nationally owned chains, the higher prices benefit corporate stockholders, not local 
residents and are not reflected in the personal income levels of the metropolitan area.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The National Football League and other sports leagues have used the promise of an all 
star game or league championship as an incentive for host cities to construct new stadiums or 
arenas, and with few exceptions, at considerable public expense.  Recent NFL studies have 
estimated that Super Bowls increase economic activity by hundreds of millions of dollars in host 
cities.  Our analysis fails to support NFL claims.  Our detailed regression analysis revealed that 
over the period 1970 to 2001, on average Super Bowls created $92 million in income gains for 
host cities, a figure roughly one-quarter that of recent NFL claims.  While this figure, like any 
econometric estimate, is subject to some degree of uncertainty, statistical analysis reveals that, 
on average the Super Bowl could not have contributed, by a reasonable standard of statistical 
significance, more than $300 million to host economies. 
Cities would be wise to view with caution Super Bowl economic impact estimates 
provided by the NFL.  It would appear that padding is an essential element of the game both on 
and off the field.     
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*The is a revision of a paper presented at the Western Economic Association International 79
th 
annual conference, Vancouver, July 2, 2004, in a session organized by Brad Humphreys, 
University of Illinois. The authors are grateful for the comments and suggestions made by 
session participants and anonymous referees. 
 
1. Steeg claimed that the NFL and NFL Properties spend a combined $43 million on Super Bowl 
XXXIV, for example. 
 
2. At the March 1999 NFL meetings, the teams agreed to allow teams to qualify for up-front 
loans in an amount equal to 34% to 50% of the private contributions for stadium projects.  The 
specific amount would be determined by the size of the project and the market the stadium 
would serve. 
 
3. Porter’s use of monthly sales receipts is important.  If the researcher can compress the time 
period, then it is less likely that the impact of the event will be obscured by the large, diverse 
economy within which it took place.  The use of annual data has the potential to mask an event’s 
impact through the sheer weight of activity that occurs in large economies over the course of a 
year unless steps are taken to isolate the event. 
 
A full description of the data used for analysis is available from the authors upon request.  
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TABLE 1 
Economic Impact Estimates Provided by Boosters for Selected Super Bowls Between 1995 
and 2003 
 
Year  Author  City  Estimate in millions of $ and  
(in millions of 2000 $) 
1995  NFL and Kathleen Davis, Sports 
Management Research Institute 
Miami $365 
($412.4) 
1998 PriceWaterhouseCoopers  San  Diego  $295 
($311.7) 
1999  NFL and Kathleen Davis, Sports 
Management Research Institute 
Miami $393 
($406.2) 




2000 Jeffrey  Humphreys, 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta $292 
($292) 





Regression results for Fixed Effect Model 
 
Model  Summary         
 R  R  Square 
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate  Durbin-Watson 
 0.87428  0.7644 0.7509 0.01474  2.03963   
           
           
ANOVA    Sum of Squares Df  Mean Square  F  Sig. 
 Regression  1.42920 116 0.01232  56.7116  0
 Residual  0.44055 2028 0.00022     
 Total  1.86965 2144     
           
 
 
Dependent Variable: %∆ Income  Coefficients  t-stat  Significance 
Independent Variables  B  Std. Error   
(Constant) 0.3827 0.0493 7.764 0.0000 
%∆ Income (t-1)  0.4432 0.0207 21.366 0.0000 
Log Population  -0.0519 0.0074 -7.006 0.0000 
Income as % of sample average (t-1) -0.0343 0.0077 -4.452 0.0000 
Taxes as % of sample average  -0.0018 0.006 -0.291 0.7714 
Wages as % of sample average (t-1)  -0.0335 0.0078 -4.287 0.0000 
Hurricane Andrew   -0.0399 0.0107 -3.736 0.0002 
Hurricane Andrew recovery  0.0582 0.0088 6.607 0.0000 
Tech Boom 1  0.0478 0.0089 5.370 0.0000 
Tech Boom 2  0.0804 0.0090 8.937 0.0000 
Tech Bust  -0.0978 0.0093 -10.497 0.0000 
Super Bowl  0.0041 0.0029 1.409 0.1590 
Oil Boom 1  0.0099 0.0040 2.505 0.0123 
Oil Boom 2  0.0153 0.0035 4.400 0.0000 
Oil Bust  -0.0268 0.0032 -8.483 0.0000 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy (MSA)  -0.0067 0.0054 -1.243 0.2141 
   …   
Year 2001  -0.0112 0.0025 -4.479 0.0000 
   …   
 
Fixed effects for individual cities/years shown for Albany MSA and the year 2001 but are 
excluded for remaining years and cities. Full results available from the authors upon request. 
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TABLE 3:  Regression results for equation (2) (t-stats in parentheses). 
Coefficients for Super Bowl dummy variables are omitted from results and instead shown in Table 4.  
 
MSA Cons.  Average 
Yt 








Time Other  Fit 


















- Adj.  R
2 = .9027 
SEE = 0.9729% 


















- Adj.  R
2 = .9314 
SEE = 0.9314% 






- -  -.185 
(-2.27) 






2 = .5186 
SEE = 2.3443%  










- Adj.  R
2 = .7308 
SEE = 1.3386% 


















2 = .8461 
SEE = 1.4108% 












- -  Adj.  R
2 = .9521 
SEE = 0.5115% 














2 = .5768 
SEE = 1.3397% 


















- Adj.  R
2 = .8635 
SEE = 1.3188% 










- -  Adj.  R
2 = .8360 
SEE = 1.1329% 


















2 = .8919 
SEE = 1.5260% 
















- Adj.  R
2 = .7303 
SEE = 1.3746%  
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TABLE 4 
Super Bowl Contribution to Local Economies 
 
Year City  Real  Income 







t-stat   Income +/- 
1970 New Orleans   $  18,748,279  1.776% 1.860% 0.084% 0.061  $         15,796  
1971 Miami   $  27,239,344  7.182% 5.332% -1.850% -1.020  $      (503,947)
1972 New Orleans   $  20,493,238  4.281% 5.855% 1.574% 1.052  $       322,620  
1973 Los Angeles   $166,013,025  4.911% 1.941% -2.970% -2.006  $   (4,929,805)
1974 Houston   $  47,263,119  8.079% 7.471% -0.608% -0.221  $      (287,386)
1975 New Orleans   $  22,191,318  2.549% 2.447% -0.102% -0.066  $        (22,664)
1976 Miami   $  31,966,339  3.434% 2.083% -1.351% -0.746  $      (431,897)
1977 Los Angeles   $178,631,079  4.810% 3.983% -0.827% -0.558  $   (1,477,256)
1978 New Orleans   $  26,342,160  3.520% 5.852% 2.332% 1.609  $       614,179  
1979 Miami   $  35,677,084  2.890% 2.567% -0.323% -0.210  $      (115,390)
1980 Los Angeles   $190,215,123  -0.688% -1.584% -0.896% -0.602  $   (1,704,380)
1981 New Orleans   $  28,341,623  2.316% 4.089% 1.773% 1.159  $       502,444  
1982 Detroit   $  95,268,030  -2.905% -4.366% -1.462% -1.282  $   (1,392,485)
1983 Los Angeles   $198,917,705  2.600% 3.414% 0.814% 0.585  $    1,618,840  
1984 Tampa   $  40,867,873  7.323% 7.707% 0.383% 0.219  $       156,553  
1985 San Jose   $  46,226,956  4.311% 3.069% -1.242% -0.762  $      (574,343)
1986 New Orleans   $  29,492,582  -0.311% -1.166% -0.855% -0.550  $      (252,203)
1987 Los Angeles   $240,763,733  2.230% 4.440% 2.210% 1.523  $    5,321,993  
1988 San Diego   $  66,440,307  4.189% 5.394% 1.206% 0.990  $       800,941  
1989 Miami   $  47,494,929  1.868% 4.078% 2.210% 1.497  $    1,049,803  
1990 New Orleans   $  29,669,092  1.247% 1.600% 0.353% 0.244  $       104,677  
1991 Tampa   $  51,242,892  -0.896% -1.330% -0.434% -0.270  $      (222,309)
1992 Minneapolis   $  79,702,545  3.413% 4.050% 0.637% 1.101  $       508,062  
1993 Los Angeles   $243,170,360  -0.256% -2.506% -2.250% -1.583  $   (5,471,429)
1994 Atlanta   $  96,197,361  4.644% 5.381% 0.737% 0.624  $       709,310  
1995 Miami   $  50,355,627  0.344% 3.139% 2.795% 1.792  $    1,407,511  
1996 Phoenix   $  71,299,199  5.070% 5.598% 0.528% 0.340  $       376,529  
1997 New Orleans   $  33,755,733  2.137% 2.768% 0.631% 0.450  $       213,078  
1998 San Diego   $  82,567,615  6.479% 8.457% 1.977% 1.601  $    1,632,475  
1999 Miami   $  57,068,632  1.458% 3.525% 2.068% 1.321  $    1,179,931  
2000 Atlanta   $139,018,879  7.578% 6.368% -1.210% -0.968  $   (1,681,953)
2001 Tampa   $  69,855,497  3.551% 1.066% -2.485% -1.093  $   (1,736,037)




Super Bowl Contribution to Local Economies assuming a $300 million Super Bowl boost. 
 









1970  New Orleans   $  18,748,279   1.600% 1.776% 3.376% 1.860% -1.516% -1.096
1971  Miami   $  27,239,344   1.101% 7.182% 8.283% 5.332%  -2.951% -1.627
1972  New Orleans   $  20,493,238   1.464% 4.281% 5.745% 5.855% 0.110% 0.074
1973  Los Angeles   $166,013,025   0.181% 4.911% 5.092% 1.941% -3.150% -2.128
1974  Houston   $  47,263,119   0.635% 8.079% 8.713% 7.471% -1.243% -0.451
1975  New Orleans   $  22,191,318   1.352% 2.549% 3.901% 2.447% -1.454% -0.937
1976  Miami   $  31,966,339   0.938% 3.434% 4.372% 2.083%  -2.290% -1.264
1977  Los Angeles   $178,631,079   0.168% 4.810% 4.978% 3.983% -0.995% -0.671
1978  New Orleans   $  26,342,160   1.139% 3.520% 4.659% 5.852% 1.193% 0.823
1979  Miami   $  35,677,084   0.841% 2.890% 3.731% 2.567%  -1.164% -0.757
1980  Los Angeles   $190,215,123   0.158% -0.688% -0.531% -1.584% -1.054% -0.708
1981  New Orleans   $  28,341,623   1.059% 2.316% 3.374% 4.089% 0.714% 0.467
1982  Detroit   $  95,268,030   0.315% -2.905% -2.590% -4.366% -1.777% -1.558
1983  Los Angeles   $198,917,705   0.151% 2.600% 2.751% 3.414% 0.663% 0.477
1984  Tampa   $  40,867,873   0.734% 7.323% 8.058% 7.707% -0.351% -0.201
1985  San Jose   $  46,226,956   0.649% 4.311% 4.960% 3.069% -1.891% -1.160
1986  New Orleans   $  29,492,582   1.017% -0.311% 0.707% -1.166% -1.872% -1.205
1987  Los Angeles   $240,763,733   0.125% 2.230% 2.355% 4.440% 2.086% 1.437
1988  San Diego   $  66,440,307   0.452% 4.189% 4.640% 5.394% 0.754% 0.619
1989  Miami   $  47,494,929   0.632% 1.868% 2.499% 4.078%  1.579% 1.069
1990  New Orleans   $  29,669,092   1.011% 1.247% 2.258% 1.600% -0.658% -0.455
1991  Tampa   $  51,242,892   0.585% -0.896% -0.311% -1.330% -1.019% -0.634
1992  Minneapolis   $  79,702,545   0.376% 3.413% 3.789% 4.050% 0.261% 0.451
1993  Los Angeles   $243,170,360   0.123% -0.256% -0.132% -2.506% -2.373% -1.670
1994  Atlanta   $  96,197,361   0.312% 4.644% 4.955% 5.381% 0.425% 0.360
1995  Miami   $  50,355,627   0.596% 0.344% 0.939% 3.139%  2.199% 1.410
1996  Phoenix   $  71,299,199   0.421% 5.070% 5.491% 5.598% 0.107% 0.069
1997  New Orleans   $  33,755,733   0.889% 2.137% 3.026% 2.768% -0.258% -0.183
1998  San Diego   $  82,567,615   0.363% 6.479% 6.843% 8.457% 1.614% 1.306
1999  Miami   $  57,068,632   0.526% 1.458% 1.983% 3.525%  1.542% 0.985
2000  Atlanta   $139,018,879   0.216% 7.578% 7.794% 6.368% -1.426% -1.140
2001 Tampa   $  69,855,497  0.429% 3.551% 3.980% 1.066% -2.915% -1.282





Probabilities for Various Levels of Economic Impact Induced by the Super Bowl 
 
Economic Impact  Probability of such an impact or greater 
having occurred 
$400 million    0.87% 
$392.8 million    1.00% 
$300 million    5.00% 
$252.7 million  10.00% 
$200 million  19.28% 
$100 million  47.40% 







Table A1:  Cities and years used to estimate model in Tables 2, 3 
 









Akron, OH  676,214 59 695,781 77 1972-2000 
Albany, NY   797,010 50 876,129 68 1969-2000 
Atlanta, GA  1,742,220 16 4,144,774 9 1972-2000 
Austin, TX  382,835 88 1,263,559 47 1972-2000 
Baltimore, MD   2,072,804 12 2,557,003 18 1972-2000 
Bergen, NJ  1,354,671 26 1,374,345 44 1969-2000 
 (State data 1969-2000) 
Birmingham, AL  718,286 54 922,820 67 1970-2000 
 (State data 1970-1971) 
Boston, MA  5,182,413 4 6,067,510 4 1972-2000 
Buffalo, NY  1,344,024 27 1,168,552 52 1969-2000 
 (Average of cities) 
Charlotte, NC  819,691 49 1,508,050 42 1972-2000 
Chicago, IL  7,041,834 2 8,289,936 3 1972-2000 
Cincinnati, OH  1,431,316 21 1,649,228 34 1969-2000 
Cleveland, OH  2,402,527 11 2,250,096 24 1969-2000 
Columbus, OH  1,104,257 33 1,544,794 41 1972-2000 
Dallas, TX  1,576,589 18 3,541,099 10 1972-2000 
Dayton, OH  963,574 42  950,177 65 1969-2000 
Denver, CO  1,089,416 34 2,120,775 25 1977-2000 
Detroit, MI  4,476,558 6 4,444,693 7 1976-2000 
Fort Lauderdale, FL  595,651 70 1,632,071 36 1969-2000 
 (State data 1988-2000) 
Fort Worth, TX  766,903 51 1,713,122 30 1976-2000 
 (State data 1976-1983) 
Fresno, CA  449,383 79 925,883 66 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
Grand Rapids, MI  753,936 52 1,091,986 59 1976-2000 
Greensboro, NC  829,797 48 1,255,125 48 1972-2000 
Greenville, SC  605,084 67 965,407 63 1969-2000 
 (State data 1969) 
Hartford, CT  1,021,033 39 1,150,619 53 1969-2000 
Honolulu, HI  603,438 68 875,670 69 1972-2000 
Houston, TX  1,872,148 15 4,199,526 8 1972-2000 
Indianapolis, IN  1,229,904 30 1,612,538 37 1989-2000 
Jacksonville, FL  610,471 66 1,103,911 57 1972-2000 
 (State data 1988-2000) 
Kansas City, MO  1,365,715 25 1,781,537 28 1972-2000 
Las Vegas, NV  297,628 116 1,582,679 39 1972-2000  
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Los Angeles, CA  6,989,910 3 9,546,597 1 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
Louisville, KY  893,311 43 1,027,058 61 1972-2000 
Memphis, TN  848,113 45 1,138,484 54 1972-2000 
Miami, FL  1,249,884 29 2,265,208 23 1969-2000 
 (State data 1988-2000) 
Middlesex, NJ  836,616 47 1,173,533 51 1969-2000 
 (State data 1969-2000) 
Milwaukee, WI  1,395,326 23 1,501,615 43 1969-2000 
Minneapolis, MN  1,991,610 13 2,979,245 13 1972-2000 
Monmouth, NJ  650,177 62 1,130,698 56 1969-2000 
 (State data 1969-2000) 
Nashville, TN  689,753 57 1,235,818 49 1972-2000 
Nassau, NY  2,516,514 9 2,759,245 16 1969-2000 
New Haven, CT  1,527,930 19 1,708,336 31 1969-2000 
 (Average of cities) 
New Orleans, LA  1,134,406 31 1,337,171 46 1972-2000 
New York, NY  9,024,022 1 9,321,820 2 1969-2000 
Newark, NJ  1,988,239 14 2,035,127 26 1969-2000 
 (State data 1969-2000) 
Norfolk, VA  1,076,672 36 1,574,204 40 1972-2000 
 (State data 1973-1996) 
Oakland, CA  1,606,461 17 2,402,553 21 1969-2000 
 (State data 1969-1987) 
Oklahoma City, OK  691,473      56 1,085,282 60 1969-2000 
Orange County, CA  1,376,796 24 2,856,493 14 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
Orlando, FL  510,189 76 1,655,966 33 1972-2000 
 (State data 1988-2000) 
Philadelphia, PA  4,829,078 5 5,104,291 5 1972-2000 
Phoenix, AZ  1,013,400 40 3,276,392 12 1972-2000 
 (State data 1972-1987)
Pittsburgh, PA  2,683,385 8 2,356,275 22 1972-2000 
Portland, OR  1,064,099 37 1,924,591 27 1972-2000 
Providence, RI  839,909 46 964,594 64 1969-2000 
Raleigh-Durham, NC  526,723 73 1,195,922 50 1972-2000 
Richmond, VA  673,990 60 999,325 62 1972-2000 
Riverside, CA  1,122,165 32 3,280,236 11 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
Rochester, NY  1,005,722 41 1,098,314 58 1969-2000 
Sacramento, CA  737,534 53 1,638,474 35 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
St. Louis, MO  2,412,381 10 2,606,023 17 1972-2000 
Salt Lake City, UT  677,500 58 1,337,221 45 1972-2000  
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San Antonio, TX  892,602 44 1,599,378 38 1972-2000 
San Diego, CA  1,340,989 28 2,824,809 15 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
San Francisco, CA  1,482,030 20 1,731,716 29 1969-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
San Jose, CA  1,033,442 38 1,683,908 32 1972-2000 
 (State data 1982-1987) 
Scranton, PA  650,418 61 623,543 84 1972-2000 
(State data 1983-1984) 
Seattle, WA  1,430,592 22 2,418,121 19 1972-2000 
 (State data 1982-2000) 
Syracuse, NY  708,325 55 731,969 73 1969-2000 
Tampa, FL  1,082,821 35 2,403,934 20 1972-2000 
 (State data 1988-2000) 
Tulsa, OK  519,537 74 804,774 71 1969-2000 
Washington, DC  3,150,087 7 4,948,213 6 1972-2000 
W. Palm Beach, FL  336,706 105 1,136,136 55 1969-2000 
 (State data 1988-2000) 
 
  Complete data on population and income were available for all cities from 1969 to 2000. 
This implies that data on income growth and income growth lagged one year were available from 
1971 to 2000. Data regarding state and local taxes as a percentage of state GDP were available 
for all cities from 1970 to 2000 and were obtained from the Tax Foundation in Washington, D.C. 
 Wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics Survey were 
available for cities as described above. When city data were not available, state wage data were 
used in its place. When possible, the state wage data was adjusted to reflect differences between 
existing state wage data and existing city wage data. For MSAs that included several primary 
cities, the wages of the cities were averaged together to create an MSA wage as noted in Table 
A1.  
  The Other dummy variable was included for cities highly dependent on oil revenues such 
as New Orleans and Houston. The first variable was set at a value of 1 for boom years, 1974-
1976 and 1979-1981, and the second variable was set at 1 for the bust years, 1985-1988. The 
Other dummy variables were also set at a value of 1 for the years 1992 and 1993 for the city of  
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Miami to account for the impact of Hurricane Andrew.  
  Income and population data were obtained from the Regional Economic Information 
System at the University of Virginia, which derives its data from the Department of Commerce 
statistics.  
 
Note:  The information in the appendix is provided for the use of the referees but is probably not 
necessary to include in the published version of the paper. A comment noting, “A full 
description of the data used for analysis is available from the authors upon request,” has been 
included in the footnotes section.   
 